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TOWARD A THOMISTIC-ANTHROPOLOGICAL
VIEW OF THE EVOLUTION
OF OBLIGATION
Charles Fay
THE CENTRAL CONTENTION of this paper is that an ethic which is both
Thomistic and evolutionary is an intrinsic possibility and that the Thomist
philosopher will necessarily adopt an evolutionary standpoint if he actually
confronts the results of the contemporary science of anthropology. An analysis
of obligation and the theory of moral determinants in Thomism reveals that
any factor which modifies human tendencies is potentially a moral determi-
nant; and if the factors which modify human appetites can be studied fruit-
fully from the point of view of bio-cultural evolution, so also can human
obligation.
The contemporary scientific study of bio-cultural evolution shows that
those human urges and needs which lie at the base of the natural law and
of every judgment of value are themselves transformed by the evolutionary
process. On the one hand we find in St. Thomas's analysis of natural law,
obligation, practical reason, and the cardinal and associated virtues, in-
sights whose perennial value is demonstrated through explaining on the
philosophical level what anthropologists know empirically concerning the
universal features of moral experience. On the other hand, the doctrine con-
cerning the nature of justice and its essential divisions as found in the Sum-
mae Theologiae cannot be applied without essential revision to the primi-
tive mode of living as this is disclosed by prehistory and comparative studies
of primitive cultures. Nor can this doctrine be applied univocally to the
agricultural state and the emerging world society. It is possible to formulate
a catholic ethics based upon needs analogously common to all humans only
in the light of an understanding of what is in actual fact universal and what
is variable in the human situation.
I. THE RELATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY
ONE OF THE characteristics of culture is that it embodies value. Hence
from the point of view of anthropologists, their science has much to con-
tribute to ethics. Recently a bibliography was brought out by several anthro-
pologists, and a survey of the approximately 2,000 items establishes the over-
lapping of ethics and the empirical sciences of man at least during the
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period 1920-1958.1 It was in fact precisely the need for a research instru-
ment on the part of those interested in cross-disciplinary work which led to
the construction of a representative selection from the more than 7,000
items of material they considered.
Some moral philosophers have also discovered the relevance of the
empirical sciences and particularly anthropology. Abraham Edel has a
general study of the substantive contributions of the biological, psychological,
and social sciences to ethics, and has also written on anthropology and
ethics.2 MacBeath studied ethnographic materials to work out the concrete
interrelation of operative ideals and social structure in four primitive cultures.3
R. B. Brandt made a number of field trips to the Hopi in order to secure
data of special interest to philosophers concerning the goals, attitudes, and
concepts of the Hopi cultural system. 4 John Ladd developed a general
theory of descriptive ethics and illustrated it by a hypothetical reconstruc-
tion of the ethical system implicit in the ethical discourse of the Navaho
Indians. 5 According to Clyde Kluckhohn, Ladd's professional training as
a philosopher enabled him to expand the ethnographic knowledge of the
Navaho. Ladd's informant (a kind of professional Navaho casuist) said to
Kluckhohn: "I have been trying to explain these things to you for thirty
years, but you never asked me the right 'questions."6
Philosophy and anthropology are vast areas of research and study with
many problems in common. The philosophers just mentioned are interested
chiefly in the study of moral orders, their concrete interrelations with culture
and their inner logic, and the problem of moral absolutes and cultural rela-
tivism. How does philosophy in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas
relate itself to the kind of data offered by anthropology? Let us consider
from the viewpoint of this philosophical tradition two large areas of anthro-
pology, dealing with the concept of culture and with the data of evolution.
The notion of culture in technical anthropological usage is a broad,
flexible (analogous) concept which can be employed by prehistorians and
students of society to integrate on an empirical level all the data and theory
concerning the manifold and divergent lives that humans have lived in
1. ETHEL M. ALBERT & CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON VALUES,
ETHICS, AND ESTHETICS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY, 1920-1958
(1959). The behavioral sciences include anthropology, psychology, sociology, political
science, economics.
2. ABRAHAM EDEL, ETHICAL JUDGMENT (1955); MAY & ABRAHAM EDEL, ANTHROPOLOGY
AND ETHICS (1959).
3. A. MAcBEATH, EXPERIMENTS IN LIVING (1952).
4. RICHARD B. BRANDT, HoPi ETHICS (1954). See also Brandt's ETHICAL THEORY ch. 5
(1959) for his views on the relationship of philosophy and anthropology.
5. JOHN LADD, THE STRUCTURE OF A MORAL CODE (1957).
6. Clyde Kluckhohn, Foreword to LADD, op. cit. supra note 5, at xiv.
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groups throughout the social continuum from savagery to civilization.
Although rejected by some scientists as too broad and tinged with valuation
for scientific discourse, this cardinal concept is "one of the key notions of
contemporary American thought. In explanatory importance and in gen-
erality of application it is comparable to such categories as gravity in
physics, disease in medicine, evolution in biology. ' 7
In 1917 Kroeber published an essay entitled "The Superorganic" in
which he gave reasons for designating culture as more than organic.8 The
contemporary scientist lacks a concept of the spiritual and consequently is
unable to cope with the superorganic aspects of culture, so that what con-
stituted for Kroeber difficulties in the "superorganic" remain to this day
without solution. But this superorganic character of culture should be of
great interest to the Thomist who wishes to demonstrate the spiritual nature
of man by using contemporary materials and the current concepts of science.
In the domain of physical anthropology we find material relevant to
morality and a philosophy of man. The fossil evidence of extinct forms of
man has led scientists to include man within the evolutionary tree of life.
To summarize contemporary findings and theory in the light of Thomistic
concepts: An abundance of fossil material of zoological types other than
homo sapiens has been found definitely associated with artifacts which could
only be the effect of a rational animal. Both the bones and the tools are
sufficiently uniform or standardized that we can say of the one that the
morphological characters breed true and of the other that they are the
effect of a tool-making animal with an abstract concept of the tool he makes
which he communicates to others as part of a tool-making tradition. This
data arguably indicates the existence early in the Pleistocene of rational
animals (as understood in Thomistic philosophy) that are ancestral to but
distinct both in morphology and behavior from homo sapiens (as under-
stood in evolutionary taxonomy). s The slow pace of early technological
evolution, coupled with a brain less than half the size we currently possess
in some instances, suggests that there are solidly probable grounds for regard-
ing such an animal as exercising powers of native intelligence which are
much more limited than those we know today. A reason limited in the
7. A. L. KEORBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS
AND DEFINITIONS 3 (1952).
8. A. L. Kroeber, The Superorganic, reprinted in A. L. KROEBER, THE NATURE OF
CULTURE (1952).
9. For a survey of the empirical evidence concerning human evolution, see SOL TAX, ed.,
EVOLUTION AFTER DARWIN, Vol. II, The Evolution of Man (1960). Shorter summaries are
found in G. W. LASSER, THE EVOLUTION OF MAN (1961), and in J. N. SPUHLER, ed., THE
EVOLUTION OF MAN'S CAPACITY FOR CULTURE (1959).
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practical order of toolmaking would also be limited in the practical ordering
of human actions, so that the exercise of acts of prudence would be carried
out less perfectly.
A Thomist, can hardly consider the implications of evolution and genetic
change without relating it to his metaphysical explanation of the individua-
tion of the human soul by determined matter. That is to say, if the human
genotype shifts in the course of history, so does the matter which individuates
the human soul. When the DNA molecules within the nucleus of the sex
cells change, there is an alteration of the matter constituting the human
body down to the molecular level. Doubtless, the genetic code of the DNA
molecule according to the Crick-Watson model has only the most circuitous
relation to what the Thomist knows as signate matter; yet such a relation-
ship does exist however roundabout, with the result that it is contradictory
to say that (a) heredity changes and also (b) the matter in which the
soul is received and which limits it is unaltered by this change. The
philosophical account of individuation I regard as certain and the anthro-
pological data as highly probable. The conclusion I draw is that the mode
or manner of existence of the human soul within the zoological type homo
sapiens is probably different from, say, Sinanthropus-Pithecanthropus or the
Australopithicinae. These differences are no doubt accidental from the
point of view of man's common human nature. Nevertheless, they are of
a type which would make all humans presently in existence different from
at least some of their ancestors in the Ice Ages and they probably have
some bearing upon even the exercise of acts of deliberation, judgment, and
command in the moral order.
This conclusion, that all humans presently in existence differ from at
least some men of the Ice Ages in ways that are relevant to the human
exercise of moral acts, could not have been drawn independently of the
discoveries of contemporary anthropologists and other scientists. And while
undoubtedly philosophers have always been aware of cultural diversity
marking off one group from its neighbors, the extent of variability as well
as the presence of certain common characteristics has not been so well
documented nor investigated scientifically. More than ordinary experience
is required to say that the common nature of rational animal is not only
incompletely realized in the multiplicity of individuals who coexist but
further that the virtualities and potentialities implicit in this nature are
realized to a variable extent in different stages of human history. 10
Traditionally, Western philosophers have taken as their starting point
10. See J. Fraiiklin Ewing, S.J., What About Evolution? 58 CATHOLIC MTNi 388 (1960).
NATURAL LAW FORUM
evidence from ordinary experience. This data from immediate experience
is examined reflectively within the context of problems and solutions of a
developing philosophical system. Change is a fact of experience and so
also is the plurality of beings about us. The philosopher, however, looks at
these facts differently from the man of common sense. He regards them
from the viewpoint of their being and he considers the problems that both
a change in being and a multiplicity of beings pose. He studies being
inasmuch as it exists, or he seeks an understanding of human nature by
analyzing man's distinctive mode of action, or in ethics he investigates the
manner in which human acts are ordered to man's proper good. The
approach of the scientist is quite otherwise. He establishes his results by
an empirical method of considering phenomena qua predictable rather
than qua existent. Hence a great deal of contemporary science is irrelevant
to the questions that have engaged Western philosophers in the past. How-
ever, it would be very strange indeed if among the many studies now
labeled scientific some new data did not arise which cast fresh light on
the way beings actually exist and operate. By situating some of these
findings within the framework of a philosophical tradition, they are placed
in a new epistemological and metaphysical system in which philosophical
reflection may extend our knowledge of real beings. As the ordinary ex-
periences of motion and diversity presented problems in the context of
early Greek philosophy, so today new intelligibilities result when the scien-
tific study of culture and evolution is related to perennial philosophical
positions.
II. THE OPENNESS OF THoMISTIC ETHICS TO ANTHROPOLOGY
FOR ST. THOMAS the. experience of obligation is implicit in the practical
knowledge that an act is desirable or that an act is necessary to realize a
good appropriate to man in virtue of certain appetites rooted in human
nature. This is a need theory of value. It is developed in a metaphysical
context which considers the tendencies of the moral agent as ordered to the
conservation and expansion of its own being. The actuality or perfection
of existence is desirable when it is related to appetite; that is, being con-
sidered as an object of tendency is good. Every being necessarily seeks its
own perfection, and viewed metaphysically this tendency means that every
being seeks to conserve and expand its existence. Ultimately, this seeking
is the creature's tendency toward God, its inclination toward imitating the
divine nature; and in seeking to maximize his own existence, man achieves
his own perfection through imitating in however diminished a manner God
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Himself. Proximately and immediately, this fullness of being consists in
the satisfaction of dynamic tendencies ranging from psycho-biological urges
(inherited from chordate and mammalian ancestors) to superorganic needs
which are communicated to matter once it has been sufficiently disposed
and elevated by the evolutionary process for the reception of the human
soul.
The eternal law or the divine reason and Author of all nature is unchange-
able. This truth is no doubt the ultimate explanation of why there are
unchangeable aspects of the law based upon human nature."1 Considered
as a divine idea, human nature is unchangeable in every way; considered
in rerum natura, it has a concrete existence in which necessity coexists
with mutability. Human nature is necessarily rational, animal, free, risible;
nevertheless in its concrete existence it is also mutable, and it is mutable
in ways which are ethically significant. The understanding man has of his
obligation is not found in him in the same way that knowledge of human
obligation is present in God as an eternal exemplar. "Whatever is received
in another is received according to the nature and mode of being of the
recipient." This Thomistic axiom might well be borne in mind in eluci-
dating the sense in which the natural moral law in man is a participation
of the eternal law. The norm of human action as present in human exper-
ience is limited by an intellect which is incarnate, which exists in time, and
which knows what is suitable through the human person's experience of
rational and sentient needs.
The experience of pan-human needs by human agents who exist in time
is subject to all the limitations of such a mode of being. It is not simply that
practical understanding of the universal requirements of human nature grows
in time, but there is an evolution of institutions and conditions which alters the
way human life is actually carried on and which transforms the obligations
humans experience in the light of their natural desires. Any factor that in-
fluences the fulfillment of human tendencies in the concrete may be viewed
as a moral determinant. These determinants are related differently to human
nature and its needs in different stages of human history.
St. Thomas recognizes three classes of moral determinants which specify
the moral quality of human action: the object, the end, and the circum-
stances. 1 2 The moral obligation of a mother to take care of her children,
for example, is deeply rooted in human needs, biological, psychological, and
social.' 3 If any bio-social needs have an absolute structuring effect upon
11. SUMMA TuEOLOOIAE, I-I, 97, 1, ad 1. (This work will hereafter be cited as S.T.)
12. S.T., I-I, 18, articles 2, 3, 4.
13. MAY EDEL & ABRAHAM EDEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 34-43.
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morality, surely this one must. In the technical terminology of St. Thomas,
such acts of the mother as feeding the child, protecting him from harm, teach-
ing him the difference between right and wrong, are actions which are good
in their object. The object of an act is understood to be the primary and
essential source of its goodness in a manner analogous to the way the sub-
stantial form of a natural thing is the source of its being. The object is to
be distinguished from the end of the agent, the good which he understands
to be present in an action and which incites him to act. The end is either
due or not, suitable or not, in the light of a holistic consideration of the
situation and man's needs.
Just as accidents also contribute to the fullness of being due to a natural
thing through modifying its being, the circumstances which in the concrete
"touch" a human act and alter its bearing upon human needs also change its
moral goodness in an accidental sense. Sometimes St. Thomas employs the
term "circumstance" in a broad way to include conditions essential to the
object of an action, conditions consequently which determine the specific
character of good and bad acts inasmuch as they have a special significance
in relation to right reason.1 4 Stealing from a sacred place, for instance, adds
a new contrariness to reason, above and beyond that already involved in theft.
Place is always an accident in relation to the speculative consideration of a
nature which prescinds from concrete determinations arising from time and
place. But what is of accidental or essential significance concerning the good-
ness or badness of human action is a problem in the area of practical reason.
St. Thomas's recognition that what is accidental in one instance may be the
essential condition of a new type of moral action in another suggests that his
theory is open to the view that variations in the symbolic significance of actions
that are cultural in character may also essentially diversify human actions.
In a study of practical reason in Thomistic theory, Naus says that custom
constitutes a factor which specifies secondary precepts of natural law. He
goes on to say:
-. . custom is not something arbitrary but rather an adaptation which
-a people make (ideally according to right reason) to the circumstances in
which they find themselves. ". . . for custom is in a way changed into
nature and produces an inclination similar to a natural one." [S.T.,
I-II, q. 58 a. 1, c.] If these customs which determine native tendencies
are reasonable, then the fixed pattern of activity they prescribe becomes
"connatural."14
14. S.T., I-I, 18, 10, c., ad 1.
15. JOHN E. NAUS, S.J., THE NATURE OF THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT ACCORDING TO
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 56-57 (1959).
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If we use the concept of culture instead of custom, we can develop St.
Thomas's ethics in a way that is in harmony with its inner dynamism while
at the same time introducing a more profound and far-reaching relativity
than St. Thomas contemplated. The concept of culture includes not merely
behavior which is "appropriate" or socially sanctioned but all socially shared
experiences and behavior which is founded upon learning. St. Thomas ap-
parently does not include human law within the notion of custom when he
says that "custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter
of law"; 16 whereas culture includes both the human law and its customary
interpretation. Culture explicitly includes technology, social structure,
economic organization, ethos and world view, factors which are related to
human needs and which, from the point of view of the moral agent, have
profound effects upon the meaning of human action. If we consider the
"within" of an action, these factors introduce extensive variability into what
is naturally right for man. The use of culture rather than custom makes
available to the ethician a vast and growing body of data concerning the
extent and limits of this variability.
Nor can the partial truth of cultural relativism be assimilated into a
Thomistic ethics by reducing the impact of culture on human needs to the
traditional category of circumstances (considered merely as accidental in
relation to right reason), for culture is a variable element in each of the three
determinants--object, end, and circumstances. We shall see in the next section
that the very nature of justice and its logical divisions into common legal and
particular justice, and particular into distributive and commutative justice,
are quite different on the level of primitive and of civilized society.
Some range of development is admitted by St. Thomas himself in grant-
ing the possibility of adding to natural law while denying that obligations
under the primary precepts may be subtracted. 17 One of his examples of
rights added to natural law is property rights, which St. Thomas classifies as
pertaining to ius gentium and which we would today regard as part of natural
law. In several places he goes further to note a concrete variability in man's
nature which alters natural rights.' s Moreover, some of the reasons he gives
16. S.T., I-1I, 97, 3, c.
17. S.T., I-I, 94, 5, c.
18. . . . natura humana non est immobilis sicut divina; et ideo diversificantur ea quae
sunt de jure naturali; secundum diversos status et conditiones hominum. In IV SENT.,
d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.
, * . propter diversas hominum conditiones contingit quod aliqui actus sunt aliquibus
virtuosi, tamquam eis proportionati et convenientes, qui tamen sunt aiis vitiosi, tamquam
eis non proportionati. S.T., I-I, 94, 3, ad 3.
. . . illud quod est naturale habenti naturam immutabilem, oportet quod sit semper
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to justify change in human law also apply in the case of natural law.' 9 Thus
it seems natural for human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect
to the more perfect in regard to natural law as well as positive. Man makes
natural progress in the exercise of speculative reason; so also growth in human
understanding in the practical order seems possible even in regard to what
is suitable to needs shared in common by all humans. If the changed con-
ditions of civil society require some variation in positive law, it seems reason-
able to hold an analogous variation in natural obligations insofar as the human
situation is altered. However, the evolution here proposed is offered as a
development of Thomistic thought rather than as a proposition formally
taught by St. Thomas.
Human law may be derived from natural law in two ways: as a conclusion
(ius gentium) from a premise, or by determining certain generalities in
natural law.2 0 As an example of a general obligation that is subject to
further determination, St. Thomas says it is a matter of natural law that
evildoers should be punished. But that they be punished in this way or that
way is a determination of the law of nature. This portion of human law is
technically designated ius civile and it is a reasonable determination of natural
law in, the light of the special history and culture of each state.
From my own point of view, I would recognize one kind of natural right
or duty which is so immediately connected with human nature that the right
or duty inheres in all humans in every society and in every time - for instance,
the right of all adult humans to marry; the obligation of parents to care for
and educate their children. From this kind of right or duty may be dis-
tinguished others which are also necessary for satisfying human needs but
only on a certain cultural level. These do not express necessities which obtain
cross-culturally but are suitable to human nature at a particular stage of
social evolution. The rights which fall under ius gentium are for the most
et ubique tale. Nature autem hominis est mutabilis. Et ideo id quod naturale est homini
potest aliquando deficere. S.T., 1I-I, 57, 2 ad 1.
The difficulty arises that these changes in the states and conditions of man are
extrinsic to the nature of man and that the cultural changes that have occurred since,
say, the Middle Ages are also "outside" or peripheral to man. It is true that such
changes are extrinsic to man's common human nature as this is understood in human
knowledge by an act of abstraction; from this viewpoint even the organic changes which
occurred during the Pleistocene and which shaped a body more subservient to the needs
of the spirit were similarly extrinsic. However, the base of evaluation is man's concrete
nature. If we consider human nature as it actually exists, such changes are intrinsic to
man and directly influence what is suitable to human appetites. That is, these changes
are intrinsic to human nature considered as concretely related to material beings, to
other humans, and to God, and the natural law inasmuch as it is a function of practical
reason is based upon human nature so considered.
19. S.T., I-11, 97, 1, c. and ad 1.
20. S.T., 1-11, 95, 2.
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part of this character. Consequently, if an evolution occurs in human institu-
tions and in ius gentium, then we must accept at least limited evolution in
natural law.
III. JUSTICE IN ST. THOMAS AND IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY
JUSTICE IS A HABIT which inclines the individual to will the good which is
due to another. It orders external actions insofar as they affect society or
another individual. In St. Thomas's treatment, justice is divided into
common legal justice which is concerned with the good of society, and partic-
ular justice whose object is the particular good of another person.2 1 This
division pertains to the very essence of justice, and it presupposes the existence
of political organization. Particular justice in turn is subdivided into two
types, depending on whether the good due to another is his share of the
common good of a community (distributive justice) or is simply due to him
from someone's private resources (commutative justice),22 Commutative
justice aims to establish an equality of thing with thing, and this is not affected
by the relationship of the persons involved, that is, whether they are relatives
or what their rank or status may be in the community.
The right or the just which is the peculiar object of justice is distinguished
into two parts, natural and positive, depending upon whether the objective
equality which justice seeks in human relations is determined by the nature
of the situation or results from some agreement among men.23 Given the
human situation, it is necessary that parents educate their offspring. This is
naturally right; it does not result from some free agreement in a human
society but is necessarily imposed upon the human will by the intellect's under-
standing of what is essential for the common welfare of the family. The right
price of a painting, on the other hand, is determined largely by private bar-
gaining; the amount of tax on income is established by the decision of some
legislative body. There is still a third kind of right arrived at by civilized
societies independently of one another and explicitly defined in their oral or
written legal codes -the ius gentium, which also seems to be in some sense
natural. An example: the rights and duties connected with the use and
management of material things.
St. Thomas's doctrine on property is rather complex.2 4 All humans have
a right to use the goods of this earth; otherwise life and the reasonable fulfill-
21. S.T., II-II, 58, 5 and 7.
22. S.T., 11-II, 61, 1.
23. S.T., 11-II, 57, 2.
24. See VERNON J. BOURKE, ETHICS 366-395 (1951).
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ment of human nature would be impossible. But in order that things may
be of human use and may actually satisfy human needs, some system of hold-
ing and managing them must be devised for the common welfare of men.
Inasmuch as man is a rational animal, he exercises by nature a dominion over
material things; and the ultimate purpose of this management is the order-
ing of material goods for human use. It is important to realize that natural
dominion is not identical with private possession, for goods may be held in
common and managed by those in charge of the group, and such a system
may sometimes be eminently suitable to the needs of human nature in partic-
ular cultural conditions.
Now let us see if we can apply St. Thomas's distinctions on the level of the
simplest human society. In order to do this, it is not necessary to attempt a
speculative reconstruction of life during the Ice Age. In isolated parts of the
world, humans have continued to exist in ecological, social, and cultural
systems which approximate (in some respects certainly and in others prob-
ably) the human situation prior to the invention of agriculture. The socio-
cultural life among the Shoshonean Indians of the Great Basin of the western
United States illustrates an essentially family level integration:
It is perhaps difficult to imagine that a family, alone and unaided, could
obtain virtually all the food it consumed; manufacture all its clothing,
household goods, and other articles; rear and train its children without
assistance; take care of its sick except in time of crisis; be self-sufficient in
its religious activities; and, except on special occasions, manage its own
recreation. Why this was so in the case of the Shoshoneans is explain-
able largely in terms of their cultural ecological adaptations.
Owing to the nature of the natural environment of the Great Basin
area and to the simple hunting and gathering techniques for exploiting it,
it was inevitable that the individual family or at the most two or three
unrelated families should live in isolation during most of the year.
"Family" in this case signifies the nuclear, biological or bilateral family,
consisting of mother, father, and children. Unlike many primitive
peoples, the Shoshoneans were not organized in extended family or line-
age groups . .. the functioning unit was the nuclear family, augmented
only by a grandparent, aunt, or uncle who otherwise would be homeless.2
Loose aggregates of comparatively independent families like the Shosho-
neans occur rarely; however, they illustrate the extreme variability of what is
naturally right. The Shoshonean concept of property rights was directly re-
lated to their mode of life. Anything resulting from individual work or
habitual use belonged to that individual, but for the most part the natural
25. JULIAN STEWARD, THEORY OF CULTURE CHANGE 102-103 (1955).
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resources of the area were available to anyone on a "first come, first served"
basis.2 6 Anyone could gather seeds, any family could fish in rivers and
streams; but the food gathered or the artifact made belonged to whoever
gathered or made it. Had families been excluded from certain territories,
starvation and death would have followed. A system of private possession
of the resources would have been essentially contrary to human nature as
concretely constituted under these social and ecological conditions. Even
groups of families did not exercise common possession, nor did the same
families constitute a stable social community. Both the groups of families
and the group leadership constantly changed. Families occasionally co-
operated in the collective hunting of rabbits, with experienced men or "rabbit
bosses" directing the activities. However, no stable territorial groups of fixed
membership were established by such means. The drives were held only
when rabbits were sufficiently numerous, involved only those families who
happened to be in the locality, and took place only if some experienced leader
happened to be present:
Since the occurrence of these factors was rather haphazard, since the
place, the participants, and the leaders were never quite the same in
successive years, the drives provided only temporary bonds between in-
dependent families. A given family was under no obligation whatever to
participate in a drive with a fixed group of families under a permanent
leader. And, since the "rabbit boss" held authority only during the drive,
the family paid little heed to him in other times, places, and contexts. 27
It is clear that on this level of Shoshonean society prudence and justice
are exercised and rights must be respected. Even property rights exist. 28
But the meaning of rights and obligations differs essentially from their mean-
ing in societies with more developed social organization and some political
organization. Under the conditions just described, the individual Shosho-
nean owed no debts under common legal justice to any leader or to any definite
social group. There were no territorial rights to be defended, no military
honors to be awarded, no means of organizing for concerted action:
Disputes and hostilities arising from such matters as murder, theft, wife-
stealing, and other violations of custom were settled between families.
None of these was a "crime" against the community, for the community
26. Id. at 107.
27. Id. at 110.
28. See Stephen C. Cappannari, The Concept of Property among Shoshoneans, in
GERTRUDE E. DOLE & ROBERT L. CARNIERO, eds., ESSAYS IN THE SCIENCE Op CULTURE
(1960), for a discussion of property among the Shoshoneans and a brief discussion of
various kinds of property.
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did not exist in any corporate or legal sense. Violations of custom
threatened families, not larger socially integrated units. Thus, the very
concept of crime presupposes some kind of suprafamily level of integra-
tion, some collectivity, which has a common purpose that must be pro-
tected against antisocial behavior by its members. 2 9
What can be the meaning of distributive justice here? It could only
be exercised within the nuclear family, and in the opinion of St. Thomas
prudence and justice within the domestic group differ essentially from the
virtues required in the distribution of goods belonging to civil society.3 0
The Shoshonean example is admittedly an extreme one. The common
human needs for mutual aid and friendship, for cooperation in subsistence
and other activities, ordinarily lead to the association of families in bands,
and bands may then federate loosely into tribes. To the extent that band
organization obtains, there is some kind of common good associated with
it which places obligations upon the individual. But in many bands, civil
society does not exist; hence the good in question is not what St. Thomas
had in mind in the definition of common legal justice. His definition pre-
sumes institutions whereby legislative, judicial, and leadership functions
are exercised in view of the common good, where human law exerts a
moral constraint upon the citizens of a political society, and where the
bonds of association extend beyond kinship. But clans and tribes are inter-
mediate forms of social organization which have not yet attained the level
of civil society; that is, education, punishment for crime, warfare are left
to the initiative of family groups.
An evolution occurs in community life and consequently in the meaning
of the common good when effective political organization is achieved. Once
this is attained, human lawmakers can legislate in view of the common
good which unites an entire community and which permits a fuller develop-
ment of human nature in that society. Both rulers and citizens exercise the
virtue of general legal justice insofar as they respect what is necessary for
the common good of the whole. Prior to political organization, however,
there are no individuals who can speak with authority in the name of the
whole community, distribute civil goods, allocate honors and responsibilities.
Role and status are comparatively undeveloped, and relationships between
persons are governed principally by age, sex, and kinship. In St. Thomas
the notion of rank or status is essential to distributive justice, for a person
29. JuuAN STZmw , op. cit. supra note 25, at 115.
30. S.T., II-I, 50, articles 1, 2, and especially 3.
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receives more of the common good according to his more prominent posi-
tion in the community.31
If we find only rough analogues of distributive justice in primitive so-
ciety, it does not follow that the justice practiced is therefore commutative.
Commutations are exemplified chiefly in buying and selling, in which one
individual pays another as much as he has received from him. St. Thomas
argues that buying and selling seem to be established for the mutual ad-
vantage of both parties, each of whom requires something belonging to the
other. "Whatever is established for the common advantage should not be
more of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all con-
tracts between them should observe equality of thing with thing."3 2 Such
considerations do not apply directly and without qualification to the eco-
nomic and social orders in most primitive societies, where the relationship
between goods or things depends upon and expresses the relationship be-
tween the persons involved.33 This is not to say that the value of goods is
entirely ignored in every nonliterate society but that their value is subordinate
to human relations. In a society based upon kinship, attention focuses pri-
marily on the relationship of the parties to the transaction rather than upon
the equality of thing with thing. Hence it is altogether misleading to think
of justice in a primitive society based on kinship ties in terms of St. Thomas's
distinctions.
IV. CONCLUSION
WE HAVE here used certain anthropological material to illustrate ethical
development. With political integration humans learn to perceive in fellow
citizens other persons who share rights and duties in a community com-
prised of individuals most of whom are not relatives by either real or fictive
ties of consanguinity or affinity. Political unification greatly increases the
all-around adaptability of society and safeguards tranquility against both
internal and external enemies. Such unification provides a broader base
of cooperation for meeting material needs and for fulfilling the higher
needs of human personality. To the extent that there have now come into
existence political and economic institutions that unite nations into larger
regional groups, and to the extent that the United Nations may eventually
develop into a world-wide political institution having power with regard
to global problems, the kind of evolution that occurred in the meaning of
31. S.T., 11-I, 61, article 2, c.
32. S.T., I-I, 77, article 1.
33. Lzsxaz A. WHITE, THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 244-46 (1959).
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the common good and general legal justice at the time of the agricultural
and urban revolutions is going on today. It is now possible for undeveloped
countries to place claims under legal justice which are binding upon the
whole world, but in a manner which is proportionate to the wealth and
economic development of the more fortunate countries.
An evolution in justice could not occur without a corresponding de-
velopment in the cardinal virtue of prudence. If human existence is altered
through transformations in human society and economy and culture, altera-
tions necessarily occur in the kind of right thinking concerning what should
be done. In more advanced countries, new species of prudence come into
being; the nonexistence of these moral species on simpler human levels must
be considered a negation and not a privation. Today, men self-consciously
assume the role of innovators in the social sphere as well as in technology
and attempt to order bio-cultural evolution in a direction which would per-
mit a fuller human life for all mankind; such persons would seem to exer-
cise a new and formally different kind of prudence from anything discoverable
concerning man in the Pleistocene Era. Thus in regard to prudence, the
principle of all natural moral virtue, it would appear that some kind of
evolution has taken place in the course of human history.
This development of human obligation in terms of justice and prudence
implies both continuity and progress in the moral life. The fullness of
being which is the object of the moral life is analogously rather than univ-
ocally common to human existence in different cultures and different
periods When the theory of analogy is extended from its speculative use
in metaphysics to a practical use in ethics, obligations under natural law
are seen to be analogously rather than univocally common. There are uni-
versal and necessary aspects of our human moral obligations but it is ex-
tremely difficult to capture these intelligibilities in univocal formulae which
bind all humans in the same respect.
It is not commonly realized that a certain universality and necessity is
implicit in the evolutionary approach to human obligation. However, evolu-
tionary theorists generally think of evolution as an irreversible process. This
process involves a certain necessity not only in man's present state but also in
the future course of evolution. Evolution is not simply irreversible in the
sense that it is statistically improbable that a sequence of gene mutations
should reverse itself, but certain steps taken in evolution are irrevocable.
Things may have proceeded differently on other worlds, but on earth rational
animals carry within every cell of their bodies chromosomes and genes which
took shape in the course of an evolution within the chordate phylum, with the
result that humans have cognitive and appetitive experiences which are
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irrevocably determined by their mammal and primate ancestry. A complex
of psycho-biological needs is present in man as a residue of his evolutionary
past.
The realization that the principle in man which makes him capable of
cultural evolution is more than organic has implications concerning universal
and necessary obligations. Evolution continues in the human species chiefly
in the area of society and culture, although the possibility of further organic
evolution cannot be ruled out. The fact of technological progress is widely
acknowledged. Technological advance, however, occurs in a social matrix
and requires forms of cooperation and a syndrome of changes involving writ-
ing, metallurgy, urbanization, and political structures. 34 If human culture
has adaptive value and exists to fulfill human needs, then an evolution in
culture and technology cannot proceed without repercussions in morality.
The state is a natural institution. Yet it did not always exist. Surely the
rise of effective political organizations, making possible higher levels of sponta-
neity and self-motion in relation to our physical setting and other humans,
must be considered progress in some absolute sense. It is progress measured
by life as a self-moving process, as measured in the development of human
potentialities and the increase of the scope of practical reason toward the
willing of the good common to all mankind. To be sure, along with more
opportunities to lead a fuller human life, there are also possibilities of greater
moral evil. As I write, the continued existence of the human species is
jeopardized by our present inability to devise effective world-wide institutions
to handle problems common to all men on earth, problems such as nuclear
warfare, the development of undeveloped countries, international cooperation
in research and industry. The human situation is indeed precarious, but it
is certain that only a being with superior moral capabilities can inflict the
physical and moral damage now possible. This condition of grave risk and
challenge contains seeds for the emergence of new levels of human coopera-
tion, of love and justice and prudence, which will increase in man that human
mode of participation in the eternal law which we call the natural moral law.
34. EVOLUTION AFTER DARWIN, supra note 9, Vol. II, pp. 153-168; VoL III, p. 228.
pp. 221-224.
